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RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORYOF THE ORIGINS OF
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2004. Pp. ix + 261.
BY ANDREW SUNTER
In stark departure from the conventional, ever-expanding body of
thought on the ontology of human rights, Alan Dershowitz forwards a
rights theory that is not predicated on human nature, logic, law, or
religious faith. Dershowitz contends that human rights exist
notwithstanding the ontological status of God; that human nature is
inherently value-neutral and, therefore, not the source of rights; that the
a priori premises of logic, while cogent in a vacuum, enjoy little
practical consensus; and that positivist legal sources cannot, in
themselves, effectively sustain rights, since they can provide no
independent means of self-evaluation.
Dershowitz characterizes his approach as a bottom up dystopian
account of human rights. Dershowitz argues that rights are founded by
human experience-we gain human rights knowledge from the wrongs of
the past. For example, the right to religious freedom was fostered by
historical tragedies of religious intolerance and persecution, such as the
Holocaust, the Crusades, or the Spanish Inquisition. If human nature is at
all relevant to human rights, it is because the human species has an unique
ability to learn from its mistakes and avoid their repetition.
Dershowitz provides a refreshing departure from the moral
essentialism that seems to dominate human rights discourse. However,
Dershowitz-more renowned as a celebrity defence lawyer and left-leaning
political commentator than as a socio-political thinker-occasionally slips
into his own undefended version of essentialism. There are moments when
Rights from Wrongs reads less like a carefully reasoned theory than a
populist polemic. Dershowitz strives to make his argument accessible to a
broad audience, and while his non-technical prose is engaging, he has a
tendency towards deconstructing straw men rather than nuanced moral
philosophies. However, while Dershowitz's thesis is not altogether
persuasive, his central claim is an important reminder that effective rights
protection depends more on hard work than ideology.
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